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Abstract 
This review of women’s participation in the legal system as expert witnesses examines the 
empirical literature on the perceived credibility and persuasiveness of women compared to men 
experts.  The effects of expert gender are complex and sometimes depend on the circumstances 
of the case.  Some studies find no differences, some find favorable effects for women and others 
for men, and still others find that expert gender interacts with other circumstances of the case.  
The findings are interpreted through social role theory (Eagly, 1987) and the role incongruity 
theory of prejudice (Eagly & Karau, 2002, Eagly & Koenig, 2008).  Future directions for 
research are identified and implications are considered for attorneys who select and prepare 
expert witnesses.  Suggestions for men and women’s behavior as expert witnesses are provided. 
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Women as Expert Witnesses: A Review of the Literature 
 Who makes a better expert witness: a man or a woman?  This review is motivated by the 
historical concern that women may not have the same “expert power” as men.  Attorneys seem to 
think jurors regard men as more credible experts than women and they may prefer to retain men 
as expert witnesses (Memon & Shuman, 1998). And indeed, gender studies often show that men 
are more influential than women, partly because they are viewed as more credible sources of 
information (see e.g., Helgeson, 2009). Whether or not expert gender affects trial outcome is, 
however, an empirical question.  The present paper reviews the literature to address two 
questions: does an expert’s gender affect jurors’ and judges’ perceptions of his or her credibility? 
And if so, does it make a difference in triers’-of-fact ultimate decisions? 
 This analysis begins with an overview of current theories about gender, gender 
stereotypes and roles, and prejudice, as well as the social psychological literature on the 
interpersonal influence of men and women.  This theoretical background is important because it 
provides the foundation for understanding empirical findings regarding the effects of expert 
witness gender.  Before detailing the data regarding men and women experts, the historical 
context of women’s and men’s involvement in the courts is reviewed.  Finally, this review ends 
with a discussion that provides directions for future research, considers implications for attorneys 
who select and prepare expert witnesses, and provides suggestions to men and women experts 
about what behaviors they might engage in to maximize their credibility.   
Stereotypes and Gender Roles 
Consider this description of a famous person:  
This individual is an accomplished 20th-century political figure who, prior to entering politics, 
worked as a research chemist and as a tax attorney. 
 
Who is this person?  Can you picture the person?  Now read this description of a famous person: 
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This internationally recognized public figure was known to be a loving and involved parent, and 
had gained a reputation for always being well-coifed and tastefully dressed. 
 
Who might this person be?  Can you picture this person?  Is the person in the second description 
unlike the person in the first?  Could they possibly be the same person?  You might be surprised 
that both passages refer to Britain’s former Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher (descriptions and 
example from Helgeson, 2009).   
 If it did not occur to you that both passages described the same person, it is because the 
first passage fits a male gender-role stereotype, whereas the second fits a female gender-role 
stereotype.  A stereotype is a set of beliefs or expectations about a certain group of people. 
Gender-role stereotypes are the expectations we hold about what women and men should be like, 
features we assign them due to the social roles they hold in our society (Helgeson, 2009).  
 But what makes up a stereotype of a man or a woman?  Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, 
Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz (1972) assessed people’s perceptions of masculine and feminine 
behavior and found strong agreement about the characteristics people associate with men and 
women.  They presented descriptive words and phrases to people, asking them to rate to what 
degree each was characteristic of men or women (e.g., aggressiveness, talkativeness).   
Broverman and colleagues (1972) defined a stereotypical feature as any aspect that 75% 
or more of men and women agreed described one gender more than the other.  This rule led to 41 
items differentiating male from female gender stereotypes.  The male stereotypes revolved 
around competence, assertion, and rationality; whereas female stereotypes focused on warmth 
and expressiveness.  For example, masculine features included items like, “very logical,” “can 
make decisions easily,” “almost always acts as a leader,” and “easily able to separate feelings 
from ideas.” The corresponding feminine features were the opposite: “very illogical,” “has 
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difficulty making decisions,” “almost never acts as a leader,” and “unable to separate feelings 
from ideas” (Broverman et al., 1972; Helgeson, 2009). 
 Which set of descriptors seems more socially desirable?  As you might expect, the 
masculine characteristics are more highly valued than the feminine characteristics (Broverman et 
al., 1972; Eagly & Kite, 1987; Helgeson, 2009).  For instance, one study demonstrated that 
masculine characteristics were rated as healthier by mental health professionals than feminine 
characteristics (Broverman et al., 1972).   Another study indicated people’s stereotypes of entire 
nations were more similar to stereotypes of the nation’s men than the women, again 
demonstrating the superiority of “masculine” traits (Eagly & Kite, 1987).  
Social Role Theory. Eagly (1987) built on the findings about gender stereotypes 
described above in developing a comprehensive theory about gender and social roles.  Her social 
role theory posits that people have different expectations for how men and women should 
behave.  Women are expected to be more warm and communal than men; that is, more 
emotionally expressive, interpersonally sensitive, and concerned about others.  Men are expected 
to be more competent and agentic than women; more controlling, independent, and assertive 
(Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2004).  Men and women who violate these expectations may be 
perceived negatively and may experience prejudice. 
The Role Incongruity Theory of Prejudice 
Prejudice was defined in 1954 by Allport as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and 
inflexible generalization” toward a person who belongs to a group, simply because he or she 
belongs to that group (p. 9).  This static definition of prejudice was widely accepted and became 
the consensual view of prejudice in social psychology for many years.  However, Alice Eagly 
and her colleagues (e.g., Eagly, 2004; Eagly & Diekman, 2005; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Eagly & 
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Koenig, 2008) critiqued the definition, arguing that the static approach was not sufficient to 
encompass the complexities of prejudice.  She and her colleagues asserted that people who 
experience discrimination may not belong to groups who elicit generalized negative attitudes.  
For instance, people generally hold positive attitudes toward women even though women are 
targets of discrimination in many contexts.   
Eagly et al. (Eagly, 2004; Eagly & Diekman, 2005; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Eagly & 
Koenig, 2008) developed an expanded theory of prejudice that rests upon the idea of role 
incongruity – that prejudice results from a mismatch between stereotypes about a person’s group 
and beliefs about what is needed to succeed in a given social role.  Rather than prejudice 
reflecting a static phenomenon, it is contextual and emerges in some situations but not in others.  
When members of a group enter or attempt to enter roles that are stereotypically 
mismatched to characteristics ascribed to their group, prejudice may occur (Eagly & Koenig, 
2008).  The key eliciting condition for prejudice is the degree of incongruity: the greater the 
mismatch between the group stereotype and the role requirements, the greater the prejudice is 
likely to be.  Eagly and Koenig (2008) described how even though an individual person might be 
evaluated favorably in a given role, the evaluations could still be prejudicial.  This is because the 
evaluation of the particular well-liked (but role-incongruent) person may still be lower than 
evaluations of stereotypically matched individuals.   
For example, consider a woman Chief Financial Officer of a large corporation.  She 
would most likely elicit a positive attitude, given the prestige of her role, but the strength of the 
positive attitude would likely be less than an equivalent male executive (Eagly & Koenig, 2008). 
The less-positive attitude would be revealed by downward shifts in beliefs held about her (e.g., 
she is not competitive enough), emotions toward her (e.g., anxiety that she might not negotiate 
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well enough), and behaviors (e.g., reticence to give her the most important assignments).  The 
phenomenon in this example occurs due to the conflict between the stereotypes associated with 
women – warmth, caring, sensitivity – and the more aggressive, competitive, agentic stereotypes 
associated with the masculine role she occupies (Eagly & Koenig, 2008). 
Gender and Interpersonal Influence 
In line with what social role theory and the role incongruity of prejudice would predict, 
studies have shown that men may be more influential and persuasive than women, especially in 
masculine roles (Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992; Helgeson, 2009).  Should women in 
masculine roles adopt masculine behaviors to increase their influence?  The answer appears to be 
no.  Several studies (Buttner & McEnally, 1996; Carli, 1990; Reid, Keerie, & Palomares, 2003), 
including a meta-analysis (Eagly et al., 1992), have shown that women who act like men when in 
masculine or leadership roles (e.g., assertive language, dominant or directive interpersonal style) 
are perceived negatively compared to their male counterparts.  The devaluation of women in 
these circumstances is greatest when the evaluators are men (Carli, 1990; Carli, LaFleur, & 
Loeber, 1995; Eagly et al., 1992; Matschiner & Murnen, 1999; Reid et al., 2003).   
For instance, Carli (1990) asked college students to listen to a man or woman deliver an 
audiotaped speech arguing for a bus fare increase, an issue about which all respondents initially 
disagreed.  Male respondents were more persuaded by women who used tentative speech, 
including tag questions, hedges, and disclaimers as compared to assertive speech, but women 
were more persuaded by women who used assertive speech.  The male speaker’s style did not 
make a difference is how persuasive he was: he was persuasive to both men and women either 
way.  Although men evaluators were more receptive to the influence of non-assertive women 
who acted in traditional or stereotypical ways, they still judged these women as less competent 
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and knowledgeable than assertive and nontraditional women (e.g., Carli, 1990; Matschiner & 
Murnen 1999).  Carli et al. (1995) found that the likeability of a female speaker led to increased 
influence but only for men respondents; again, men seem to be more influenced by women who 
use a feminine rather than masculine style of speaking. Thus, women may face a dilemma when 
they are expected to behave submissively but the situation requires assertive skills to succeed.  
These background theories and social psychological bodies of research are critical to 
understanding how women experts may be perceived in the courtroom.  Is being an “expert 
witness” perceived as a masculine social role?  If so, how might women fare in this gender-
incongruent social role?  Would social role theory hold that she should she show feminine traits, 
or should she adopt masculine characteristics while serving in this role?  These and other 
questions will be answered as we review data about women’s involvement in the courts and 
studies that have zeroed in on questions like these. 
Gender in the Court 
 Women have not always been welcome to participate in the legal process; in fact, 
historically women were excluded from access to every role in the courts and were subjected to 
systematic negative biases in every facet of the legal process (Goodman-Delahunty, 1998; Price, 
Recupero, Strong, & Gutheil, 2004; Walters, 1994).  This exclusion was based on the notion that 
women lacked the required physical fortitude and discerning intellect and would “skew the 
otherwise reliable factfinding process” (Babcock, 1993, p. 1168).  These attitudes reflected the 
social consensus at the time that women’s place was in the home.  For instance, in the 19th 
century, physicians and educators warned that young women who studied long, hard hours 
would badly damage their reproductive systems and perhaps go insane (Distant, 1875; Fausto-
Sterling, 1992; Maudsley, 1874).   
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 The boundaries of women’s social roles have changed over time.  The courts now 
officially view gender discrimination and bias as adversely affecting the quality of the 
factfinding mission of the courts (Walters, 1994). However, surveys have continued to find that 
professional women within the court system report experiencing gender discrimination (e.g., 
Price et al., 2004; Riger, Foster-Fishman, Nelson-Kuna, & Curran, 1995). Price et al. (2004) 
surveyed forensic psychiatry expert witnesses about perceptions of gender bias in the courts, 
finding that women experts were almost twice as likely as men to believe that gender is a factor 
in the selection of an expert witnesses (80% versus 41%; Odds Ratio = 5.8).  Although 
sometimes men experts were preferred, the women also reported that attorneys at times explicitly 
told them they wanted a woman expert because they thought it would help their case. For 
example, in cases involving sexual harassment and rape, defense attorneys might retain women 
experts to bolster the credibility of male defendants (Price et al., 2004). 
 In the 1980s and 1990s, several state and federal courts commissioned studies on gender-
based discrimination in the courts.  The Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness 
in the Courts (1989), for example, found that 55% of female attorneys, compared to 13% of male 
attorneys, believed judges assigned more credibility to male than female expert witnesses.  Studies 
examining gender bias in the Ninth Circuit and by the Texas Supreme Court found that whereas 
male attorneys and judges generally believed gender prejudice had virtually disappeared over time, 
their female counterparts reported many continuing areas of bias (Coughenour et al., 1994; Texas 
Supreme Court Gender Bias Task Force, 2004).  
Other gender biases identified by the Texas Supreme Court task force (2004) and by Riger 
et al. (1995) included attorneys addressing female expert witnesses with patronizing language and 
improper titles (e.g., Ms. instead of Dr.) and judges expecting greater credentials before qualifying 
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women as expert witnesses compared to men in the same profession. The latter example is 
consistent with the role incongruity theory as described above.  Given that courtroom roles were 
traditionally masculine domains, women who enter the expert witness role may face a double 
standard in terms of how competent they must be to successfully participate in the court process 
(see also Foschi, 2000).   
These data raise questions about to what degree women are retained as experts compared to 
men, and whether women expert witnesses can be as effective as their male counterparts. Walters 
(1994) answered the first question by examining federal case law opinions for cases between 1980 
and 1993 in the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia.  Her findings showed that women appeared infrequently as experts compared to men; 
making up 11% of experts identified in written court opinions and testifying in 21% of cases 
overall. However, because of the longitudinal nature of her data, she was also able to show that 
more women experts were being retained in the later years of the analysis than the earlier years. 
This trend has likely continued in the years since 1994. Several other studies have investigated the 
second question, whether women experts can be as effective as men, by examining their perceived 
credibility and effects on trier-of-fact decision making.  We now turn to those studies. 
Effects of Expert Witness Gender 
Prior research has found inconsistencies in whether expert gender affects perceptions of 
expert witness credibility and persuasion: sometimes it does and sometimes it does not.  As 
gender researchers have found in many other domains, context is critically important for 
understanding how women and men will be perceived (e.g., Eagly & Diekman, 2005; Goodman-
Delahunty, 1998).  Although main effects have emerged in some studies of expert witness 
gender, interactions emerge in most others. Null findings are reviewed first, followed by main 
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effect findings (e.g., either favoring men or women outright), followed by studies that have 
identified boundary conditions showing when and how expert gender interacts with other aspects 
of cases (e.g., favoring men under some conditions and favoring women in others). 
Null Findings. Some studies have found that expert gender does not affect credibility, 
suggesting that it may make no difference to a case whether a woman or a man expert witness is 
retained (e.g., Memon & Shuman, 1998; Titcomb-Parrott, Neal, Wilson, & Brodsky, in press; 
Vondergeest, Honts, & Devitt, 1993).  For example, Vondergeest and colleagues (1993) found 
that expert gender did not affect mock jurors’ verdicts in an armed robbery trial in which the 
expert witness testified about conducting a polygraph examination of the defendant.  However, 
the Vondergeest et al. (1993) study may have included a relatively weak manipulation of expert 
gender, as the transcripts were written and the manipulation included only a description of the 
expert as either a “he” or a “she.”  Memon and Shuman (1998) also found no differences based 
on expert gender despite an arguably stronger manipulation.  They showed photographs of their 
male and female expert witnesses while an audio presentation of the trial transcript presented 
mock jurors with information about a civil medical malpractice suit.  The authors noted in their 
“limitations” section that the gender manipulation may have been weakened by the audio 
transcript, which was read by a male narrator in both conditions. 
Titcomb-Parrott and colleagues (in press) presented the trial transcript through a video 
tape, a medium through which even stronger gender cues were present, as visual, verbal, and 
nonverbal cues associated with gender were involved.  This study involved a criminal trial in 
which a violent offender was facing potential capital punishment sentencing.  The expert witness 
testified about the defendant’s likelihood of reoffending.  Despite the stronger manipulation of 
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expert gender, these authors found it had no effect on and did not interact with other variables 
(e.g., knowledge) on perceptions of credibility or mock juror decisions.   
Main Effect Findings. Main effect findings are straightforward and easy to interpret, but 
sometimes they can brush over underlying differences between contexts or situations if the 
context or situation is not accounted for in the analysis.  Some main effect findings regarding 
men and women experts have been uncovered.  For example, Larson & Brodsky (2010) exposed 
mock jurors to a videotaped summary of a criminal murder trial and an excerpt of a cross-
examination of a forensic mental health expert. They found a main effect advantage favoring 
male experts over female experts.  Specifically, male experts were rated as more likeable, 
believable, trustworthy, confident, and credible than female experts in their study.  The authors 
also examined whether non-intrusive cross-examination vs. intrusive questions (i.e., “Have you 
ever treated on your husband/wife, Doctor?”) would differentially affect how men and women 
experts were perceived. They found no interaction between expert gender and style of cross-
examination questions on ratings of the experts. 
A few studies have found female expert witnesses have a main effect advantage for 
women experts over her male counterparts.  For example, Couch and Sigler (2002) presented 
mock jurors with a written summary of a civil case involving an automobile accident.  Plaintiff’s 
evidence came from an automobile engineer who was either a male or female expert.  The 
authors predicted that the female automotive engineer expert witness would not be as persuasive 
as a male, a hypothesis that was not supported.  Expert gender made no difference in terms of 
verdict.  However, expert gender did affect in the amount of compensatory damages awarded to 
the plaintiff, but in the opposite direction than predicted.  Specifically, the female expert witness 
elicited more compensatory damages than did the male. 
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Swenson, Nash, and Roos (1984) asked mock jurors to listen to an audiotape of a 
simulated child custody hearing to evaluate the effects of expert witness gender.  The testimony 
concerned the witness’s opinion about the parents in the custody dispute. They found a trend 
suggesting that female expert witnesses may be judged as more expert than males. The trend 
favoring women might be influenced by the type of case; a case that took place in family court 
and involved family matters, a feminine type of domain (Walters, 1994).  Swenson et al. (1984) 
tentatively suggested that the finding may be consistent with gender-role stereotypes that women 
are better judges of the needs of children than men.  
Although these main effect findings do exist in the literature, it seems they do not well 
represent the whole story of expert gender effects.  Rather, the story seems to lie more in the 
boundary conditions under which interactive effects, or contextual effects, emerge.  That is, in 
some kinds of cases or situations, women systematically outperform men as experts.  In other 
kinds of cases or situations, men systematically outperform women.  Some of these contexts 
have been identified, which we review here.  However, much work remains to be done to further 
understand the conditions under which men and women can be powerful experts. 
Contextual Interactions. The majority of the studies that have examined the effects of 
expert gender on persuasion and perceptions of credibility show more complexity than simple 
main effects.  Some of these conditions include the gender “domain” of the case itself, the 
complexity of the information the expert needs to convey to the trier of fact, whether or not 
deliberation is required, the timing of the expert testimony, and the degree to which expectations 
for behavior are violated by experts.  Examples of these kinds of studies are presented below.  
Although there are labels representing different kinds of contextual effects, several of these 
studies overlap and could fit under the other subtitles.   
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Domain of the case. A series of studies examined the gender congruency of the case; that 
is, the congruency between the domain of the case and the experts’ gender (McKimmie, Newton, 
Terry, & Schuller, 2004; Schuller & Cripps, 1998; Schuller, Terrie, & McKimmie, 2001).  For 
example, Schuller et al. (2001) presented men and women testifying as plaintiff experts in a civil 
antitrust price-fixing case reflecting either the “masculine” field of construction (i.e., the supply 
of crushed rock to a road construction company) or the “feminine” women’s clothing industry 
(i.e., supply of fine cotton to a women’s clothing company).  The authors expected the woman 
expert to be more persuasive than the man in the female congruent case and the man to be more 
persuasive than the women in the male congruent case.  Consistent with predictions, the male 
expert was more persuasive in the male-dominated domain, but in the female-dominated domain, 
there was not a significant difference in damage awards.   
Although Schuller et al.’s (2001) findings suggest that men experts have a differential 
advantage over women in male congruent cases but that women and men may be equally 
persuasive in “feminine” cases, other studies have found that women may in fact have a 
differential advantage over men in female congruent cases (e.g., McKimmie et al, 2004; Schuller 
& Cripps, 1998).  One reason the woman may not have been as persuasive as expected in 
Schuller et al.’s (2001) feminine domain is because the testimony in this particular cases 
revolved around price-fixing, a topic that may have been perceived as masculine. 
 Complexity of testimony. A follow-up study by Schuller, Terrie, & McKimmie, (2005) 
investigated expert gender and complexity of the experts’ testimony.  They used the same 
antitrust price-fixing agreement civil case.  They expected to find that the male expert would be 
more persuasive than the woman, but only when the testimony to be presented was complex.  
The results were consistent with the hypothesis; the man elicited higher damage awards for the 
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plaintiff in the high-complexity condition.  However, they also found (unexpectedly) that the 
woman elicited higher awards than the man in the low-complexity condition.   
Effects of deliberation. McKimmie et al. (2004) extended these findings into group 
discussions by having mock jurors deliberate before filling out the measures.  The case again 
involved the price-fixing allegation in either a male or female oriented domain (i.e., 
tire/automotive service business vs. cosmetics sales business) and the plaintiff expert testimony 
was provided either by a male or female expert witness.  Mock jurors were asked initially to 
complete the measures independently and then to engage in a group deliberation in which they 
were asked to try to reach an agreement with regards to the appropriate amount of damages to be 
awarded.  After group discussion, they were asked to rate the same items they had rated prior to 
deliberation.  Results indicated that experts whose gender was congruent with the case domain 
were more persuasive than incongruent experts (for men and women).  They also found that 
group deliberation exaggerated these effects, which appeared to be mediated through 
participants’ evaluations of the expert witness.   
Timing of expert testimony. The impact of expert gender and timing of testimony was 
investigated by Schuller and Cripps (1998) in a simulated audiotaped homicide trial involving a 
battered woman who had killed her abuser and claimed self-defense.  The authors examined 
timing of testimony because they hypothesized that hearing the expert testimony about battered 
woman syndrome before the defendant’s account would provide jurors with an organizing 
framework for understanding the battered woman’s perceptions and actions.  Findings revealed 
that when the expert was a woman, mock jurors found the defendant’s claim more believable, the 
defendant less responsible, the husband more responsible, and their verdicts were more lenient.   
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This effect was, however, qualified by a two-way interaction between expert gender and 
timing of testimony.  When the expert testified early, participants were more likely to believe the 
defendant’s claim and hold the husband responsible, but only when the expert was female.  
When the testimony was presented late, expert gender and testimony had no effect on mock 
jurors’ ratings.  The pattern of results suggests that female experts may be more favorable to a 
defendant’s battered woman syndrome case, particularly when the testimony is presented early. 
The authors speculated that “jurors may believe a woman has a better understanding of a battered 
woman’s position than a man, and thus the testimony she conveys [may be] seen as more 
trustworthy than the identical testimony provided by a man” (Schuller & Cripps, 1998, p. 28).  
Violations of normative expectations for behavior. A series of studies has shown that 
expert gender may matter, but only when the expert somehow violates the trier-of-fact’s 
expectations for the expert’s behavior (Brodsky, Neal, Cramer, & Zeimke, 2009; Neal, 
Guadagno, Eno, & Brodsky, 2012).  For example, Neal et al. (2012) found that experts who met 
threshold expectations of likeability and knowledge were not perceived differently based on their 
gender; however, when they were not likeable, male experts were perceived significantly more 
positively and were more persuasive than female experts.  That is, likeability may be important 
especially for women, but it may not matter much if men experts are unlikeable.  These studies 
suggest only women may fare poorly in the expert witness role if she is not perceived as both 
likeable and competent.   The authors took a social role theory perspective (Eagly, 1987) and 
suggested that the woman was in a masculine occupational role – an expert witness – but that per 
performance suffered when she violated normative gender expectations for likeability.  This 
rationale was further supported by pilot studies finding that without the occupational role, 
participants evaluated images of the experts’ similarly.   
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Neal and Brodsky (2008) exposed mock jurors to a videotaped excerpt of an expert 
mental health witness testifying about a defendant’s recidivism likelihood in a capital murder 
sentencing hearing.  They varied the amount of eye contact the expert made with the mock jurors 
(i.e., by looking directly at the camera) and with the questioning attorney, with conditions of low, 
medium, and high eye contact.  Based on previous literature about gender and nonverbal 
behavior norms, the authors expected that the men experts would be rated as credible in the 
medium and high eye contact conditions (but not in the passively low condition), and that the 
women would be rated as credible only in the medium conditions (not the low or the assertively 
high conditions). They also expected that men would be rated as more credible than women in 
the high eye contact condition.   
Results provide information about the relative importance of eye contact for men and 
women expert witnesses: eye contact appears to be especially important for men experts’ 
credibility.  Only men experts in the high eye contact condition had high credibility ratings, 
whereas the female experts’ credibility was not affected by how much eye contact she made.  
These results suggest it may not matter what a female witness’ eye contact behavior is like, but 
that male experts should maintain high levels of eye contact for maximum credibility. 
Discussion 
The expert witness role appears to be a traditionally masculine social role, given the 
historical exclusion of women from all aspects of the trial process.  With time, the rigidity of this 
gendered role is relaxing, as more and more women participate as expert witnesses and other roles 
in the trial process.  Nevertheless, there remain potential consequences for women serving in this 
role.  For example, in her analysis of federal court trials, Walters (1994) found that women 
testified infrequently as the sole expert for a party, accounting for only 7% of solo appearances.  
WOMEN AS EXPERT 
WITNESSES  19
   
She explained, “This skewed ratio may indicate that litigants feel testimony by women must be 
supplemented to satisfy the same evidentiary burden” (p. 638).  This finding is consistent with 
Eagly and colleagues’ role incongruity theory of prejudice (Eagly, 2004; Eagly & Diekman, 2005; 
Eagly & Karau, 2002; Eagly & Koenig, 2008). 
The role incongruity theory predicts that the greater the mismatch between the gender 
stereotype and the social role requirements, the greater the prejudice is likely to be (Eagly & 
Koenig, 2008).  These consequences are most likely to occur in situations that heighten the 
salience of the incongruity between the female gender role and the masculine occupational role 
(Eagly & Karau, 2002).  Consistent with this prediction, many of the studies reviewed in this paper 
demonstrate that the domain of the case and the experts’ area of expertise may matter.   
For example, Walters (1994) found a discernible division of labor among experts along 
traditional gender lines.  Specifically, women were more likely to participate in “human” disputes 
involving education, family services, and social services.  For instance, women experts accounted 
for 75% of the experts involved in education controversies.  In contrast, in masculine domains such 
as economic controversies, female experts were virtually unrepresented.  Women accounted for 
4% of the experts in corporate cases and 0% of contract disputes.   
Experimental studies demonstrated that men were more persuasive to mock jurors than 
women in “masculine” domain cases, such as price-fixing in the construction and tire/automotive 
service industries (McKimmie et al., 2004; Schuller et al., 2001).  However, for cases requiring 
expert testimony pertaining to areas that women may be perceived as more knowledgeable about 
than men, such as in child custody and battered women cases, some findings suggest women may 
be somewhat more persuasive than men (e.g., McKimmie et al., 2004; Schuller & Cripps, 1998).  
Areas of expertise such as child custody and battered women may be seen as appropriate for 
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women experts but less appropriate for men, and as a consequence, men’s testimony may be 
devalued in these kinds of cases (Schuller & Cripps, 1998). 
Professional women may face a trade-off between their professional and gender role 
expectations (see Figure 1).  If they fulfill gender role expectations, they may be perceived as 
less competent or powerful professionals, whereas if they adhere to their professional role 
expectations they may violate gender role expectations and be perceived negatively as a woman 
(e.g., Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2004; Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992).   
 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
  
Figure 1. A Professional Woman’s Dilemma.  
This dilemma stems from a conflict between the stereotypes associated with women – 
warmth, caring, sensitivity – and the more aggressive, competitive, agentic stereotypes 
associated with the masculine role she occupies when she adopts the expert witness role (Eagly, 
1987; Eagly & Koenig, 2008).  Given this conflict, she is likely to face a double standard where 
she must meet the expectations required of her due to her gender, but also must meet (or more 
likely, exceed) the expectations required for competence as an expert witness.  Many of the 
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findings reviewed in this paper support these predictions, which emerge from both social role 
theory (Eagly, 1987) and the role incongruity theory of prejudice (e.g., Eagly & Koenig, 2008). 
For example, judges sometimes required greater credentials of women before qualifying 
them as experts compared to men in the same profession (Riger et al., 1995; Texas Supreme 
Court Task Force, 2004).  Neal et al. (2012) showed that women experts must not only be 
competent, but they must also be likeable in order to be effective witnesses.  In contrast, men did 
not have to be likeable in order to be persuasive experts – they only had to be competent.   
Across these studies, gender stereotypes sometimes influenced perceptions of the experts, 
but were usually not determinative of the ultimate case decision (e.g., verdict, sentence, damage 
awards).  This is good news: peripheral variables like expert gender should not determine triers 
of facts’ decisions. Rather, their decisions should be based on the content of testimony, the 
substance of a case, and the strength of evidence.  A variable like expert witness gender is one of 
many pieces of information decision makers must integrate in formulating a decision.  
Although expert gender did not often affect ultimate decisions, it did affect perceptions of 
credibility.  Credibility is an intermediate decision: it is not an ultimate legal decision, though it 
is certainly part of the process through which triers-of-fact reach their ultimate decisions.  
Specifically, in criminal cases where the ultimate decisions were categorical (i.e., guilt and 
sentencing), expert gender typically did not influence the ultimate decision.  However, in civil 
cases where the ultimate decision were continuous (i.e., damage awards), expert gender 
sometimes did influence the decision.  These findings suggest that although stereotypes of men 
and women may influence intermediate judgments, ultimate decisions that are absolute 
categories may not be as influenced by such stereotypic cues.   
Directions for Future Research 
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 Additional high-quality research can shed light on several remaining questions.   For 
example, what is the relative balance women experts should strive for in terms of demonstrating 
feminine characteristics while serving in the “masculine” role of expert witness?  Should she 
wear a skirt suit instead of a pant suit?  Should she use tentative language?  How should men 
experts behave in cases that are traditionally within the feminine domain of expertise?  How 
might the leaders who emerge as influential in jury deliberations affect the perceptions of men 
and women experts? 
The existing studies reviewed in this paper each have limitations, and thus research 
studies that use innovative methods or generate answers to creative questions that address some 
of these limitations have the most potential to contribute meaningfully to this literature.  For 
instance, most of the studies focused on the trial process itself, a rare event in the criminal justice 
process.  Most cases are pled out or settle prior to this phase.  How might expert gender affect a 
defendant’s likelihood of pleading guilty, or affect the likelihood that a case will settle prior to 
trial?  Another common limitation is that almost none of these studies examined the effects of 
jury deliberation, a reality of many trials.  And the one study that did examine how the process of 
deliberation might diminish or exaggerate the effects of expert gender suggested that the 
deliberation process had a real impact on jurors’ decisions, which appeared to be mediated 
through participants’ evaluations of the expert (McKimmie et al., 2004).  
Another remaining question is, “Might composition of the jury be relevant?”  Some 
studies have suggested that the way jurors perceive men and women experts might be affected by 
the juror’s gender or the gender role stereotypes they hold.  For instance, Schuller and Cripps 
(1998) found that men seemed to be more persuaded than women jurors by a woman expert in a 
battered woman syndrome case. Kovera, Levy, Borgida, and Penrod (1994) found that women 
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jurors rated expert testimony more positively than men, judged the credibility of the expert more 
positively, found the testimony more helpful and important, and perceived psychological 
evidence to be more scientifically sound.  In contrast, Memon and Shuman (1998) found no 
significant differences between men and women participants’ perceptions or ratings of male and 
female experts (though again, they noted their manipulation may not have been very strong). 
Either way, it appears there more research can shed light on the conditions under which jurors 
might be more or less likely to be influenced by a source characteristic like expert gender.  
Perhaps questionnaires measuring sexism or gender role ideology could be useful for inclusion 
during jury selection procedures.   
Might expert gender effects be stronger in cases with salient gender cues?  The studies 
that have looked at domain of case have begun to investigate this question, but perhaps there are 
other ways it might be addressed.  For instance, a rape case or a child abuse case might elicit 
results in which both intermediate and ultimate judgments are affected by stereotypic cues.  
Future research should clarify under what conditions women and men experts might affect 
ultimate trial issues.  Furthermore, we need research that will uncover how the courts might 
reduce the salience of expert gender cues or otherwise effectively cue decision makers to correct 
for potential gender bias. 
We already have some indication of how gender bias might be corrected.  Take for 
example, Schuller et al.’s (2005) study that found men experts elicited higher damage awards 
when the testimony was complex, but that women experts elicited higher damage awards when 
the testimony was not complex.  This finding might be interpreted through Wegener and Petty’s 
(1997) flexible correction model.  This model predicts that people will correct for their own 
perceived bias when they recognize potentially biasing cues, and that at times, people may 
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overcorrect, which may manifest as bias in the opposite direction.  Perhaps the mock jurors 
exposed to complex testimony in Schuller et al.’ (2005) study were not cued about potential 
gender bias.  But perhaps when they were exposed to a woman expert, especially one testifying 
about simple matters, the jurors might have been cued to correct for potential bias against the 
woman.  They might have thought something like, “I’m going to prove to the world that I’m not 
biased against women” and over-adjusted their judgments accordingly, so that men were actually 
perceived as less persuasive than women in that low-complexity condition.   
Couch and Sigler’s (2002) study showing that a woman automobile engineer elicited 
higher damage awards than a man expert in a civil case may also have included a salient gender 
cue that highlighted the issue of potential gender bias and assisted mock jurors in 
(over)correcting their biased judgments.  The research questions that remain are whether there 
were gender bias cues in these studies (and what they might have been), as well as how courts, 
judges, attorneys, and perhaps even experts themselves might cue triers of fact to correct (but not 
over-correct) for potential gender biases. 
Implications for Men and Women Experts and Attorneys Selecting Experts 
Although many questions about the expert power of men and women experts remain, 
some suggestions for men and women experts and for attorneys who retain them can be 
generated based on the data currently available.  Note that as time passes and the boundaries of 
social roles change, many of these suggestions may become obsolete.  Nevertheless, for now 
they may be useful to consider (although ironically, by writing these suggestions I may be 
delaying progress in this area.  I hope this is not the case). 
The studies reviewed suggest that men experts may have a slight advantage overall in 
terms of perceived credibility and persuasiveness to jurors.  However, there are several situations 
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in which this slight advantage is likely to disappear (or even invert, so that women have an 
advantage).  Thus, attorneys might be well-advised to consider the domain of the case.  Does the 
case revolve around a traditionally masculine issue, like the construction industry, taxes, or 
contracts?  If so, a man expert may have a slight advantage (depending on the composition of the 
jury or the judge’s proclivities).  If the case revolves around a traditionally feminine issue, like 
child custody or domestic violence, a woman expert may have a slight advantage (again, 
depending on the trier of fact).  Attorneys might also consider the complexity of the data that 
must be conveyed to the trier of fact.  When the testimony is complex, men may have an 
advantage.  When it is not complex, women may have an advantage. 
For both men and women, competence is an important prerequisite for credibility as an 
expert witness.  However, both men and women experts may also need to attend to gender role 
expectations in order to maintain their perceived credibility as expert witnesses.  For example, 
for men, it appears that maintaining high levels of eye contact (“assertive eye contact”) with 
whomever is asking questions and with the trier of fact is important for credibility (Neal & 
Brodsky, 2008).  This requirement did not hold for women experts – women were perceived as 
credible whether they had low, medium, or high levels of eye contact (Neal & Brodsky, 2008). 
In contrast, likeability appears to be especially important for women experts, but does not 
appear to be as important for men experts (Brodsky et al., 2009; Neal et al., 2012).  The studies 
that have examined expert witness likeability suggest that witnesses should strive to use informal 
speech, such as minimizing technical jargon, explaining key terms, and using the name of the 
defendant or plaintiff rather than referring to him or her as “the defendant” or “the plaintiff.”  
Experts attending to their likeability should also use modest rather than excessively certain 
statements, be willing to smile on occasion if appropriate to the situation or context,  and use 
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inclusive statements (e.g., the words “we” or “us” when discussing members of the scientific 
community; Brodsky et al., 2009; Neal et al., 2012).  
Women experts might also be mindful of the social psychological literature showing that 
women leaders are perceived negatively when they adopt masculine characteristics while serving 
in “masculine” roles.  Given that the expert witness role is traditionally a masculine social role, 
the literature suggests women who adopt the role should demonstrate some feminine traits while 
in the role (e.g., Buttner & McEnally, 1996; Carli, 1990; Carli et al., 1995; Eagly et al., 1992; 
Reid et al., 2003).  The particulars of how this might look are not well understood, and thus 
research is needed to shed light on this question as well.  Might women who wear skirt suits 
instead of pant suits be perceived as more feminine, and thus be less likely to be penalized for 
violating traditional gender roles?  How about women who are deferential and respectful in their 
speech on the stand?  Or would this “submissive” speech style backfire and impair her perceived 
competence and persuasiveness?  How might the answers to these questions depend, again, on 
the preferences of biases of the trier of fact?   
In sum, the data available to date indicate there are some gender differences in how men 
and women experts may be perceived, but most of these differences are relatively small and are 
contextually determined.  The existing body of data provides some implications for how men and 
women experts might behave in order to maximize their perceived credibility, which is reviewed 
above.  Nevertheless, very expert witness is an individual and each case is unique.  Perceived 
credibility may vary by audience, case context, testimony material, and so forth.  Thus, each new 
opportunity to hire an expert or to adopt the expert witness role is a fresh opportunity to learn 
and adjust to the environment.   
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